Jump to content

Rapid Support Forces

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Rapid Support Forces
قوات الدعم السريع
CommanderHemedti
Deputy headAbdul Rahim Dagalo[1]
Head of operationsOsman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed (since November 2024)[2]
East Darfur commanderAbdul Rahman Jumma
SpokespersonYousif Ibrahim Ismaeil (2021–2024)
Mohamed Mokhtar[3] and Al-Fateh al-Qurashi[4] (2024–present)
FoundationAugust 2013
AllegianceGovernment of Sudan (2013–2023)
Territory of the Rapid Support Forces (2023–2025)
Government of Peace and Unity (2025–present)
IdeologyBaggara interests[5][6]
Arab supremacy[7][8][9][10]
New Sudan (self-presented, disputed)[11]
Anti-Islamism[12]
Secularism[13]
Tribalism[14][15]
Notable attacks
Size100,000 (2023)[16] to 150,000[17]
Part ofNational Intelligence and Security Service and Sudanese Armed Forces (until 2023)
AlliesState allies:
Sudan (before 2023)
United Arab Emirates (denied)[18][19][20]
Chad (alleged, denied)[21][22][23]
Non-state allies:
Wagner Group (until early 2024)[24][25][26]
Libyan National Army (denied)[27][28]
Tamazuj[29]
Non-RSF Janjaweed
SPLM-N (al-Hilu) (since 2025)[30]
Puntland (alleged)[31][32]
OpponentsState opponents:

Non-state opponents:
Battles and wars
Flag
Websiterapidsupportforce.com
Preceded by
Janjaweed

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF; Arabic: قوات الدعم السريع, romanized: Quwwāt ad-daʿm as-sarīʿ) are a Sudanese paramilitary force formerly operated by the Sudanese government.

They originated as auxiliary force militias known as the Janjaweed used by the Sudanese government during the War in Darfur, which the government later restructured as a paramilitary organization in August 2013 under the command of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the current leader of the RSF, better known as Hemedti. Since 2023, they have been fighting a civil war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of the country, after having taken power along with the SAF in a military coup in 2021. As of 2025, they have established a parallel government with their allies called the Government of Peace and Unity to rule over the territories under their control.

The RSF's motives are widely characterized by academics, journalists, and other local and international observers as Arab supremacist and economic in nature. Their forces have been documented committing war crimes on a vast scale against members of non-Arab ethnicities in Darfur and against Northern Sudanese Arabs (Ja'alin and Shaigiya) in Khartoum state and Gezira State because of their perceived support of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Many of the RSF’s fighters come from Baggara Arab tribes residing in the Darfur region of Sudan, Chad or elsewhere in the “Baggara belt” of the Sahel. Their fighters are largely recruited as mercenaries, with funding coming from the capture of gold mines and patronage by corporate and state actors; the group has also hired out its fighters as mercenaries to fight in conflicts and assist governments outside Sudan. As a result of these activities, the leaders of the RSF have become some of the richest people in the country. The RSF has adopted an anti-Islamist stance in its public relations, and has claimed its new state will be a secular democracy with a bill of rights, but these postures have been met with widespread skepticism by observers given the RSF's behavior on the ground.

The RSF's relations with other states are complex and largely veiled. The UAE has been widely accused of secretly supplying it with financial support.[42][43] The RSF has recruited many fighters from neighboring Chad, the government of which has also been accused of supplying it with arms and military assistance; Chad has ceased any formal relations with Sudan in an effort to quell these accusations. The UN has reported that RSF supply lines run in part through Libya, and that RSF forces have been deployed to Libya to work for the Libyan National Army. They have also fought in the Yemeni civil war on a mercenary basis as part of Saudi Arabia's intervention in the conflict. Al Monitor reported at the outset of the civil war in 2023 that the Israeli government was privately split on which side to back, citing an anonymous Israeli official, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said to favor the SAF and the Mossad said to favor the RSF.

The RSF has been accused of crimes against humanity, including genocide of the non-Arab population, by the International Criminal Court, Human Rights Watch, Genocide Watch, and the federal government of the United States. In the course of the civil war, their forces have killed hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians, used sexual violence systematically, imposed deliberate starvation, and pillaged and burned homes, hospitals, and places of worship, leading millions to flee and creating an ongoing humanitarian crisis. They have been documented gang raping women and forcing them into marriages, recruiting child soldiers, and forcing civilians to enlist under pain of death. During the 2019 military coup, they killed, raped, unlawfully detained, and pillaged the homes of hundreds of protesters and activists, especially during the Khartoum massacre.

Background

[edit]

RSF has its roots in the Janjaweed militias used by the Sudanese Government in its attempts to fight the anti-government insurgency during the war in Darfur. RSF was officially formed in 2013, following a restructuring and reactivation of Janjaweed militias in order to combat rebel groups in Darfur region, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, following joint attacks by Sudanese Revolutionary Front rebels in North and South Kordofan in April 2013.[1]

Logo change

[edit]

On 18 April 2023, the RSF removed the word "Quds" (Arabic: قدس), an acronym for Quwwāt ad-Daʿm as-Sarīʿ (Arabic: قوات الدعم السريع, "Rapid Support Forces") but also Arabic for "Jerusalem", from its official logo.[44] The revised version of the logo without the word "Quds"[45] was used in RSF's published statements, while the previous slogan remained on the RSF's Facebook and Twitter social media accounts. Prior to the logo change, the RSF described Hamas as a terrorist movement,[46] and Israel attempted to mediate between RSF and SAF in the current civil war in Sudan.[47]

  • The original logo, with the word "Quds" (Arabic: قدس) in the middle
    The original logo, with the word "Quds" (Arabic: قدس) in the middle
  • The logo used by RSF in its statements, the word "Quds" is absent from its centre
    The logo used by RSF in its statements, the word "Quds" is absent from its centre

Leadership and numbers

[edit]

RSF is headed by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa ("Hemedti"), who has been its leader since it was created in August 2013.[48][49] As of September 2019, Hemedti's brother Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo is the deputy head of RSF.[1] Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed has served as head of operations.[50]

RSF was estimated by Human Rights Watch as having about 5,000–6,000 soldiers in February 2014 in Darfur.[51] In 2016–2017, RSF had 40,000 members participating in the Yemeni civil war. In late October 2019, 10,000 had returned to Sudan.[52] In July 2019, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, during the Second Libyan Civil War, supporting the Libyan National Army commanded by Khalifa Haftar.[53]

According to Reuters, as of 2023, the paramilitary force has a personnel of over 100,000 servicemen.[16]

Ideology

[edit]

The RSF is widely characterized as violently Arab supremacist or ethno-fascist, an ideology with a preexisting history in Sudan. The journalist Nicholas Niarchos has said that "Arab supremacy is one of the RSF’s animating ideas,"[54] Jérôme Tubiana, an advisor to Médecins Sans Frontières on refugee issues with a focus on Sudan and Chad, described them in 2019 as threatening to "transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism",[55] and Sudanese human rights advocate Amgad Fareid Eltayeb has described them as "a fascist decentralized militia".[56] Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, has described both them and their antecedents in the Janjaweed as having massacred hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians in Sudan and driven millions from their homes.[57] In line with this, the International Criminal Court has accused the RSF of committing genocide, systematic rape and sexual violence, deliberate imposition of starvation, and other war crimes against the non-Arab population,[58] a position echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the closing days of the Biden administration.[59]

Yasir Zaidan, a political researcher at the University of Washington, has advocated for a view of the RSF as "ethno-mercenarist", fueled not only by "Arab supremacy ideology" but also by "land disputes, desertification, and local and regional interventions". He claims that the RSF is not an "ideology-driven insurgency, where mobilization is doctrine-first and organizational", but rather that the RSF recruits through Arab ethnic and tribal networks in the region by offering economic incentives to fight constantly, capitalizing on widespread youth unemployment, access to local gold wealth, and the interest and patronage of corporate and state actors such as the UAE. In this picture, Arab supremacism is not the driving force behind the RSF but only one factor in what makes them possible, with purely economic considerations also playing a major role.[5][60]

Following the April 2019 revolution, the RSF has taken a hard line against Islamists. Hemedti claimed to have "exposed all the [Islamists'] schemes and the terrorists' plans and extremists' plans" following a crackdown in 2023.[61] According to political professor and director of the Royal African Society Nicholas Westcott, the RSF’s roots in anti-Islamism comes from a reaction of Islamist benefactors of Omar al-Bashir largely siding with Abdel Fatteh al Burhan.[62]

The Sudanese author Amgad Eltayeb has claimed that while the RSF "has strategically positioned itself as a vanguard against 'Islamists'," this is a way to conceal its war crimes under the guise of counter-terrorism. He also stated that "certain establishment pundits and diplomats have echoed this narrative, casting the RSF as a viable bulwark against an 'Islamist resurgence'". and 'a veneer that conceals its historical criminal nature, patronage networks, illicit resource extraction and foreign sponsorship", such that designation of the RSF as "anti-Islamist" is "partisan sloganeering" to conceal its actions and "not objective analysis" in his eyes.[63] He has also characterized the RSF as "an entity that was established and constructed by the Islamist regime under General Omar al-Bashir to impose its ideology and racist 'civilisational project'." of promoting Arab supremacy and anti-African sentiment.[64]

The researcher Jérôme Tubiana described Hemedti as leading the Janjaweed under his command to murder the mostly Muslim and non-Arab population of Darfur. According to witness testimony, "the Janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad and rape non-Arab civilians in the name of 'jihad'" in 2006.[55]

In February 2025, the RSF announced that it had formed an agreement with its allies to form a secular and democratic "New Sudan" government with a bill of rights.[65] However, their stated commitment to the rule of law has also been greeted with widespread skepticism. Alan Boswell, Horn of Africa project director for the International Crisis Group, described the move as purely motivated by the RSF's desire to "increase its own legitimacy and leverage" and lamented that it was most likely to "only make the war even harder to end and Sudan even harder to piece back together."[66] DW quoted unnamed UN officials in 2025 as making similar comments, fearing that the formation of a parallel government would only fragment Sudan further and undermine diplomatic efforts to create peace;[67] Al Jazeera quoted a spokesman for UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres as making similar comments, expressing concern that the move would "increase the fragmentation of the country and risk making this crisis even worse".[68] Osama Abuzaid, a political researcher affiliated with the CEDEJ in Khartoum, reported "heightened skepticism" among observers about the intentions of the RSF, citing the risk of "a facade of civilian rule without substantive democratisation" with "military-backed structures [continuing] to shape power behind the scenes".[69] In August 2025, the UN Security Council issued a statement against the RSF's formation of a parallel government, urging the RSF and SAF to instead come to a peace agreement that could lead to "a credible, inclusive transition to a civilian-led government that can lead the country towards democratic elections" and expressing "alarm" about "reports of a renewed RSF offensive this week in El Fasher".[70]

Role

[edit]

Migration control

[edit]

In addition to its role in Darfur, RSF is deployed to patrol the border with Libya and round up Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in response to the Khartoum process, which is an initiative between European and African states, including Sudan, to stem the flow of migrants to Europe.[71][72]

Business interests

[edit]

In November 2017, Hemedti used RSF to take over control of gold mines in the Darfur region, which led to him becoming one of the richest people in Sudan by 2019.[73] Hemedti's brother Abdul Rahim, deputy head of RSF, heads the Al Junaid (or Al Gunade) corporation involved in gold mining and trading in Sudan.[74]

In December 2019, a Global Witness investigation into RSF and Al Junaid argued that RSF and Al Junaid are closely linked in terms of financial transactions. Global Witness stated that "the RSF and [Al Junaid had] captured a swathe of the [Sudanese] gold industry and [were] likely using it to fund their operations." The General Manager of Al Junaid stated to Thomson Reuters that there were no close links between the two.[74]

RSF has two front companies called GSK, a Sudanese technology company, and Tradive General Trading LLC, a United Arab Emirates-based company, both controlled by Hemedti's brother Algoney Hamdan Dagalo.[74]

In April 2023, Al Jazeera reported that RSF had sought out Western public relations firms to burnish its image, including by editing Wikipedia pages.[75]

Former Sudanese government staffer Ahmed Ibrahim stated that during the war, the RSF aimed to “strip Sudan of its national resources” utilizing its long coast on the Red Sea.[76]

Foreign relations

[edit]

Chad

[edit]
See also: Chad–Sudan relations

The RSF maintains facilities in Amdjarass, Chad, including an airfield and hospital, used for logistical support and medical treatment. While Chad publicly denies supporting the RSF, reports indicate the UAE uses Chad to supply weapons to the RSF, and there are accusations from Sudan that Chad provides direct aid, like weapons and mercenaries.[77][78][79] Sudan has denied any ongoing diplomatic contacts with Chad to ease tensions over Khartoum’s accusations that N’Djamena is providing support to the paramilitary RSF.[80] Ethnic connections, particularly among Arab tribes, and poverty drive Chadian youth to join the RSF, adding to regional instability. This recruitment is a significant aspect of their relationship, often happening with or without formal government approval.[81]

Ethiopia

[edit]
See also: Ethiopia–Sudan relations

Ethiopia’s relationship with the RSF is complex, with some evidence pointing to individual Ethiopian involvement. In January 2024, authorities in Gedaref State, Sudan, announced the arrest of six Ethiopian women accused of serving as snipers for the RSF, with reports indicating they had been operating within the group for over a year, leveraging sniping expertise gained in Ethiopia.[82] Ethiopia offers diplomatic backing to the RSF due to tensions with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which aligns Ethiopia with actors opposing Egyptian interests.[83] Recently, Ethiopia has hosted peace initiatives, such as the February 2025 High-Level Humanitarian Conference for the People of Sudan in Addis Ababa, organized by the UAE and attended by the African Union and IGAD, despite criticism from Sudan’s government.

Israel

[edit]
See also: Israel–Sudan relations

In January 2022, a visit by Israeli officials, including Mossad members, to Khartoum, was interpreted by SAF junior and middle ranked staff as Israeli support for the RSF.[84] In April 2023, Israeli authorities were split between support for the RSF, which Mossad favoured, and the SAF, which the Israeli Foreign Ministry favoured.[85][86] Al Monitor dated Mossad involvement in Sudan back to the 1980s, alluding to Operation Moses and Operation Joshua.[85]

Libya

[edit]
See also: Libya–Sudan relations

According to UN reports, the RSF's supply lines include through Libya, where it has procured landcruisers used in its military operations, and procures both oil and weapons, including artillery items and ammunition. RSF military leadership and troops have been recorded entering Libya, and have cooperated with brigades of the Libyan National Army in southern Libya, including salafist Zuwayya brigades allied to the LNA, despite the official closure of the border, ordered by the General Command of General Khalifa Haftar’s LNA.[87]

Kenya

[edit]
See also: Kenya–Sudan relations

On 15 June 2025, Bellingcat published an investigation revealing Kenyan-labelled ammunition crates found in an RSF depot near Khartoum. These crates, containing 14.5×114mm API cartridges and 82mm HE Mortar Bomb Type PP87, bore labels indicating delivery to the Kenyan Ministry of Defence in 2023–2024. Videos and images, geolocated to Salha, Omdurman, and posted between 19–21 May 2025, showed SAF soldiers with these crates, following the SAF's regain of control on 20 May 2025.[88][89]

On 24 June 2025, the Sudanese government called on Kenya to immediately cease any form of assistance to the Rapid Support Forces. In a separate statement on 16 June, government spokesperson Mwaura stated that Sudan's allegations were "false and misleading" and that Kenyan engagement with the RSF and SAF was strictly within the framework of the IGAD peace process.[90]

United Arab Emirates

[edit]
See also: Sudan–United Arab Emirates relations

Gold mined in Sudan was sold and sent to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, where RSF leader Hemedti kept most of his money.[91][92][93] In 2019, Global Witness reported that a document suggested that the RSF bought over 1,000 vehicles during the first six months of 2019 from dealers in the UAE. Most of the vehicles were Toyota pickup trucks which can be converted to technicals.[74] Dagalo met with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in February 2022.[94] Sheikh Mohamed also met Sudanese Armed Forces General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan in February 2023.[95]

In June 2023, the UAE set a field hospital in Amdjarass, Chad with the stated goal of assisting Sudanese refugees. According to African officials, the hospital was treating wounded Rapid Support Forces fighters.[23] According to UN and American officials, the charity which was controlled by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed was also an effort to smuggle weapons to the RSF.[96] The UAE denied arming any side of the conflict. According to the New York Times, US intelligence intercepted multiple calls between Dagalo and Sheikh Mansour.[96] According to Sudanese diplomats, Hemedti’s closest ally in the Emirates is Sheikh Mansour.[91]

In November 2023, accusations from Sudanese military officials against the UAE alleged support to RSF led to a diplomatic freeze. This was followed in December 2023 with the explusion of diplomats between the two countries. However, gold shipments flowed freely from Sudan to Dubаi, with exports facing no obstacles and operating with official approval from Sudanese army administered Port Sudan. Political tensions did not disrupt the lucrative trade. Atef Ahmed, the Secretary-General of the Goldsmiths Union, affirmed the ongoing flow of shipments to the UАЕ.[97]

In December 2023, a group of Democratic members of the US Congress called on the UAE to cease its backing of the RSF.[98]

In March 2024, Sudan's Permanent Representative to the UN, al-Harith Idriss wrote a letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting the condemnation of the UAE's alleged support to RSF in the war. The 78 page complaint alleged that the UAE planned and supported the RSF's aggression against Sudanese military with assistance from Chad.[99] He also stated that supplies including 1,200 four-wheel-drive vehicles, reached to the RSF militia from the UAE.[100] The UAE mission to the UN responded by claiming that the allegations made by al-Harith Idriss were false allegations designed to distract from the violations that are happening in Sudan and requested that the Sudanese army attend peace talks with the RSF in Jeddah which the Sudanese army has rejected to attend in May 2024.[101]

On 17 April 2024, the US envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello said that the US is concerned about reports that the UAE is financially supporting RSF.[102]

In July 2024, a 41-page document sent to the UN security council claimed that four Emirati passports were recovered from a wrecked armored vehicle in Omdurman city. A source familiar with the discovery alleged to the The Guardian that they belonged to UAE intelligence officers. The UAE ambassador to the UN stated that the passports belonged to a delegation from a UAE-based humanitarian group called International Charity Organization that visited Sudan in May 2022 before the war started and that no photograph proof was provided to substantiate claims that they were seized from an armored vehicle.[103]

On 9 September 2024, HRW reported that the RSF newly obtained advanced foreign-made weapons and military equipment. On examination of photos and videos of weapons used in the conflict that were posted on social media, the rights group identified that companies registered in China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, and the UAE were associated with the weapons provided to RSF.[104] Human Rights Watch reviewed images of show crates with markings indicating they were manufactured in 2020 and initially acquired by the UAE Armed Forces in through a contract with Adasi, a subsidiary of UAE-based weapons manufacturer Edge Group. A January 2024 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan deemed the UAE's alleged support to the RSF as "credible".[105]

On 11 October 2024, Sudan wrote a letter to the UNSC, calling for an urgent action against the UAE's "continuous aggressive activities". The letter contained new proof of the UAE providing military, financial, and logistical support to the RSF. It also included images of artillery ammunition boxes, as well as Dubai-based trucks used for transporting arms and ammunition, which were later seized by the SAF. Sudan alleged the UAE of hiring mercenaries to fight for the RSF, and presented evidence indicating that the militia fighters received medical treatment at Zayed Military Hospital in Abu Dhabi. The letter urged the Security Council to condemn and hold the UAE responsible for its involvement in the conflict, claiming that the Emirati actions are against international law and the UN system.[106]

In November 2024, Chris Van Hollen and Sara Jacobs filed a joint resolution of disapproval aimed at blocking arms sales to the UAE until it stops arming the RSF. The two U.S. lawmakers raised concerns about the government's decision to approve another weapons sale worth $1.2 billion to the UAE, while it is one of the primary foreign actors involved in intensifying the war in Sudan and warned that these arms could end up in the hands of the RSF.[107]

On 14 November 2024, an investigation by Amnesty International revealed that Nimr, which are produced by the EDGE Group in the UAE and consolidated with the French Galix System, were being used by the RSF in Sudan. Agnès Callamard called it a violation of the UN arms embargo imposed on Sudan, and urged France to ensure that Lacroix Defense and KNDS France, which designed the Galix system, to halt the supply of such systems to the UAE.[108]

In March 2025, top Democrat Gregory Meeks halted U.S. arms sales to the UAE due to its role in the Sudan war. He also introduced the "U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act", a bill that aimed to stop U.S. military aid to nations fueling the conflict. The bill also intended to impose sanctions on warring factions and allocating funds for a special envoy for Sudan.[109] On 11 March, other Democrats, including Chris Van Hollen and Sara Jacobs, also reintroduced their own separate legislation– the "Stand Up for Sudan Act". It aimed to block U.S. arms sales to the UAE under the Arms Export Control Act, until it stops supporting the RSF. Citing the UAE’s complicity in a genocide in Sudan, the lawmakers stated that America should not arm nations which are profiting from these atrocities.[110]

On 23 March 2025, senior Sudanese army commander Yasir al-Atta warned that the airports of N’Djamena and Amdjarass in Chad would be considered a legitimate military target, and criticized the UAE for supplying weapons to the RSF. Sudan claimed the UAE provided RSF Chinese-made “Long Wang 2” strategic drones in December 2024, which were used in attacks launched from Chad. Al-Atta claimed to take a retaliatory action against Chad President Mohamed Kaka and the “corrupt centres of influence” in South Sudan, that is, the UAE. Calling the UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed “the devil of Arabs”, al-Atta said to pursue the UAE, a major supporter of the war.[111]

In April 2025, Sudanese diaspora-led groups called for consumer boycotts, accusing the UAE of inciting the crisis in Sudan and complicity in genocide. Investigations by journalists, human rights organizations and the UN experts revealed that the UAE provided material support to the RSF in exchange for access to Sudan’s resources. In the same month, the Sudanese government filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice, accusing it of breaching the Genocide Convention. Nas Al Sudan, an organization leading advocacy work and mutual aid campaigns, also accused the UAE of fueling the conflict by backing the RSF. Moreover, Activists Tasneem and Rania, associated with London for Sudan and Madaniya, alleged that the UAE exports most of its gold from Sudanese mines controlled by the militia.[112]

In August 2025, mercenaries from Colombia were identified inside the Zamzam camp in Darfur. Nearly 400 former Colombian soldiers were hired by an Emirati security company and deployed the Desert Wolves battalion to fight for the RSF militias. The Spanish-speaking mercenaries were tricked to sign up for a job to guard oil facilities, but ended up as the front liners in the war.[113]

Russia (Wagner Group)

[edit]

According to a report by Al Araby TV, there are allegations of a connection between the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, and Hemedti. Leaked documents and sources reportedly indicate that the Wagner Group has provided training and equipment, including armored vehicles and helicopter gunships, to Hemedti's forces. The Russian company is alleged to have provided security services during Hemedti's visit to Russia in 2018.[114]

Hemedti's association with the Wagner Group may raise questions about his own involvement in human rights violations, particularly given his role in the crackdown on protesters during Sudan's 2019 revolution and as the founder of the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group accused of committing human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.[114] The Sudanese government has denied any connection to the Wagner Group, and the reports suggest that Hemedti may be using his position in the Sovereign Council to establish ties with the Russian company.[115] Both Hemedti and Sudan's military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had ties to the Putin regime in Russia. According to Business Insider, "The two generals helped Russian President Vladimir Putin exploit Sudan's gold resources to help buttress Russian finances against Western sanctions and fund his war in Ukraine."[116] The Wagner group reportedly has left Sudan as of early 2024, coinciding with talks between the Russian deputy foreign minister and the leader of the Sudanese government, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.[117][118] Later the same year, Russia, along with Iran, began delivering weapons, jet components, fuel, and drones, to the Sudanese government in its effort against the RSF, allowing the military to recapture parts of the capital, Khartoum, from the RSF.[119]

History

[edit]

International civil wars

[edit]

War in Darfur

[edit]
Main article: War in Darfur
See also: International Criminal Court investigation in Darfur

During the war in Darfur, in 2014 and 2015, RSF "repeatedly attacked villages, burned and looted homes, beating, raping and executing villagers," aided by air and ground support from the Sudanese Armed Forces.[51] RSF executions and rapes typically took place in villages after rebels had left. The attacks were systematic enough to qualify as crimes against humanity according to the Human Rights Watch.[51]

Yemeni civil war

[edit]
See also: Foreign relations of Yemen

RSF has participated in the Yemeni civil war, supporting the pro-Hadi forces. RSF and other Sudanese security forces, participating in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen alongside Saudi and Emirati forces,[120] have killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure, for which they are suspected of war crimes by the Human Rights Watch.[121][122][123][124] Saudi Arabia organised and financed this involvement, which brought financial resources to the RSF.[125]

In 2016–2017, RSF had 40,000 members participating in the Yemeni civil war. In October 2019, 10,000 members had returned to Sudan.[52]

The RSF's activities in Yemen were multifaceted, focusing on military operations within the coalition's strategy. They supported efforts to create a buffer zone in northern Yemen, as reported by Jamestown Foundation.[126] They were a lead force in capturing northwestern provinces, particularly Hajjah governorate, and played a role in the strategic capture of Midi port in January 2017, believed to be a Houthi supply hub via maritime lines maintained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Their deployment included ground operations, which faced tactical difficulties due to Yemen's mountainous terrain.

Second Libyan civil war

[edit]
Main article: Libyan civil war (2014–2020)

During the 2019 Western Libya offensive phase of the Second Libyan civil war, in July 2019, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Khalifa Haftar and based in Tobruk, which was fighting against the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli.[53]

Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

[edit]
Main article: Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
Map of Sudanese Civil War
Map of Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
  Controlled by Sudanese Armed Forces and allies
  Controlled by Rapid Support Forces
  Controlled by SPLM-N (al-Hilu)
  Controlled by allied Rapid Support Forces and SPLM-N (al-Hilu)
  Controlled by SLM (al-Nur)

On 15 April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and RSF broke out after RSF mobilised in cities across Sudan. Fighting was reported at the presidential palace and army headquarters.[127][128]

The conflict resulted in RSF being designated as a rebel group by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On the day of the clashes, which included the Battle of Khartoum, both sides claimed control over Khartoum and Merowe airports and other sites.[129]

On 17 April 2023, the United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken and RSF leader Hemedti held talks, and the latter agreed to a 24-hour armistice beginning on 18 April 2023 "to ensure the safe passage of civilians and the evacuation of the wounded".[130]

Another 72-hour nationwide ceasefire was announced to begin at midnight on 24 April 2023. The United States and Saudi Arabia had mediated the truce on humanitarian grounds. The fighting had caused the deaths of more than 500 people by 25 April 2023, and thousands were injured.[131] The Rapid Support Forces were supported by the Libyan militia leader Khalifa Haftar and the United Arab Emirates.[citation needed] Footage of thermobaric shells captured by the Sudanese military suggested that the weapons were supplied by the United Arab Emirates; Egypt had sent military support to the Sudanese army.[33][132] On 1 July 2024, the RSF took full control of Singa. This surge in violence caused many civilians to flee towards Gedaref in eastern Sudan. On 30 June 2024, the army[which?] also targeted 17th Infantry Division headquarters, General Intelligence Service (GIS) buildings, and the guesthouse[where?]. The RSF's dominance extended over the entire city, including the deserted headquarters of the Sudanese Army's 65th Brigade. The RSF also secured the Blue Nile Bridge, hinting at a possible expansion towards al-Dinder.[133]

The RSF has tried to re-employ officials from the pre-war civilian administration. But many civil servants have escaped both to avoid the fighting and having to work with RSF military personnel. This lack of effective RSF administration, alongside the complexity of Sudanese ethnic tensions and alliances shaped by the fighting, have seriously undermined Hemedti's ambition to transcend his warlord persona.[134]

A report by The Wall Street Journal revealed that mercenaries were becoming a tool for foreign actors like the UAE and Egypt for attaining a strategic advantage in the Sudan war. In November 2024, Colombian fighters were seized from Darfur and were later identified as recruits of an Abu Dhabi-based firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG). The military contractors were hired through a Colombia-registered recruitment firm, International Services Agency (A4SI). They were first taken to the UAE, then to Benghazi in Libya, and were finally deployed to Sudan. The Colombian recruits were "duped" to support the UAE's efforts in bolstering RSF's position in the war.[135]

In February 2025, RSF and its allies signed a charter in Nairobi, Kenya, to form a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" to govern RSF-controlled areas, potentially splitting Sudan further.[68][136] On 21 March, SAF retook the presidential palace in Khartoum, which now stands as a symbolic victory against the RSF.[137] On 26 March, SAF declared Khartoum "free" from RSF, completing the drive-out after nearly two years of occupation.[138]

The RSF seized control of El Fasher in October 2025.[139] The group conducted mass killings and massacres of civillians, known as the El Fasher massacre.[140][139]

Following a widespread international outcry, the RSF claimed in late October 2025 to have arrested a notorious figure, Issa Abu Lulu a.k.a. Brig. Gen. Al-Fateh Abdullah Idris, who has been featured in videos publicly shared by the RSF killing civilians extrajudicially and on the basis of their tribal origin, including in El Fasher.[141][142] The RSF denied that he was an official member of the group and alleged instead that he "leads a group fighting alongside us", promising "accountability" for his actions. Simultaneously, Hemedti announced the formation of an "investigation committee" to look into crimes committed by RSF troops, saying as well that "there will be accountability". Sudanese investigative journalist Eiad Husham reported that "scepticism runs deep, even after Abu Lulu’s arrest", as "the RSF’s repeated pattern of distancing itself from field commanders implicated in atrocities has become a familiar tactic", allowing them to burnish their image while maintaining ties with local militias in practice.[143]

Human rights violations

[edit]

Khartoum massacre

[edit]
Further information: Khartoum massacre

During the dispersing of the peaceful sit-in in Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces raped dozens of women according to the testimonies of the victims.[144]

RSF killed 100 protestors, injured 500, raped women and pillaged homes in the Khartoum massacre on 3 June 2019 during the 2018–19 Sudanese protests.[145][146][147] During the first day of Eid al-Fitr in Sudan, in June 2019, there were reports that RSF tied bricks of cement to the bodies of dead protestors to make them sink to the bottom of the Nile and never be found.[148][149][150][145] The Central Committee of Medical Doctors stated that more than 100 people had been killed.[151] On 6 June 2019, Kumi Naidoo, the head of Amnesty International, called for the "[immediate withdrawal of] all members of the Rapid Support Forces from policing and law enforcement anywhere in Sudan and especially in Khartoum".[151]

Al-Dalij

[edit]

The Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors reported Janjaweed/RSF shooting dead nine people in the market of the village al-Dalij (or al-Delig) in Central Darfur on 10[152] or 11/12[153] June 2019. The massacre and the burning down of the market were interpreted by locals as a response to civil disobedience.[153]

Violations during the Yemeni civil war

[edit]

In addition to the killings in Khartoum, other human rights violations during the 2018–19 crisis have been attributed to the RSF, including the rape of 70 male and female protesters during the Khartoum massacre and the following days;[144][154] the targeting of peaceful sit-ins;[155] and attacks on hospitals.[155]

In December 2018, a New York Times report revealed the fact that during the Yemeni civil war, children were recruited and sent to fight in the frontline by the militia.[156]

Violations during the 2023 Sudan conflict

[edit]
Main articles: War crimes during the war in Sudan (2023) and RSF atrocities in Khartoum
See also: Masalit massacres (2023–present)

During the 2023 Sudan conflict, the militia members have reportedly committed crimes such as looting of houses and evicting their residents,[157] sexual violence,[158] and repurposing[159] churches and hospitals as shields. In a report released on 28 July 2024, Human Rights Watch documented widespread acts of sexual violence, including gang rape and forced marriages, committed by RSF in Khartoum since the onset of the conflict. The 89-page report, titled "Khartoum is Not Safe for Women", highlighted the severe impact on women and girls. Both the RSF and SAF obstructed humanitarian aid, exacerbating the survivors' plight. Despite the clear evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, neither party took meaningful steps to prevent or investigate these abuses. Human Rights Watch called for urgent international intervention to protect civilians, support survivors, and hold perpetrators accountable.[160] The RSF has been trying to rehabilitate its image as a "killer militia" by disciplining some of its fighters and building civil administrations. Few observers take these efforts seriously as atrocities committed by its fighters are so widely documented.[134]

In July 2023, authorities reported at least 88 cases of sexual assault on women across the country, most of them blamed on the RSF.[161] Non-governmental organizations estimated that the figure could possibly reach 4,400.[162]

On 12 November 2024, the U.S. sanctioned RSF commander in East Darfur Abdel Rahman Jumma over serious human rights violations, including allegations of harm to civilians in conflict, sexual violence, and ethnically motivated attacks.[163]

On 7 January 2025, the U.S. government officially accused Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of committing genocide and imposed sanctions on the group's leader, Hemedti. These sanctions, which include asset freezes and a travel ban, are intended to hold the RSF accountable for widespread violence, including ethnic killings, rape, and forced displacement. Additionally, seven RSF-owned companies based in the United Arab Emirates were also sanctioned.[164][165]

Capture of El Fasher

[edit]
Main articles: El Fasher massacre and Siege of El Fasher

After an 18-month siege, in October 2025, the RSF captured the city of El Fasher, the largest city in the Darfur region. Reports contained accounts of massacres of unarmed, non-Arab civilian communities and other large-scale atrocities. Systematic killings were committed, the RSF tortured and shot civilians who attempted to leave. In October, they committed systematic massacres in a major hospital.[166][167] Sudan Doctors Network and international researchers say RSF fighters killed unarmed people because of their ethnicity, carried out door-to-door raids and executions, and committed acts of sexual violence against women and girls. A report which contained satellite imagery of El Fasher which was analyzed by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) stated that swaths of civilians had been killed in the Daraja Oula area. The HRL believes that "the actions by [the] RSF... may be consistent with war crimes and crimes against humanity (CAH) and may rise to the level of genocide.”[168] According to estimates, the RSF takeover has resulted in over 2,000 civilian deaths, sparking widespread ethnic violence, and deepening the humanitarian crisis. Arab states and human rights groups have condemned these actions.[169][166][170][171]

Other violations

[edit]

According to multiple media reports, the RSF abused immigrants who are crossing Sudan to Europe.[172] A report by Human Rights Watch revealed the militia unlawfully detained dozens of citizens including political activists.[173]

Ranks

[edit]
Commissioned officer ranks
Rank group General / flag officers Senior officers Junior officers
Sudanese Rapid Support Forces
فريق أول‎‎
Fariq 'awal 		فريق
Fariq 		لواء
Liwa 		عميد
Amid 		عقيد
Aqid 		مقدم
Muqaddam 		رائد
Ra'id 		نقيب
Naqib 		ملازم أول
Mulazim awwal 		ملازم
Mulazim

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c "Sudan: Former President al-Bashir denied bail in corruption trial". Al Jazeera English. 7 September 2019. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
  2. ^ "UN imposes sanctions on two RSF generals for war crimes". Sudan Tribune. 9 November 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2025.
  3. ^ https://en.imarabic.com/sudans-founding-charter-32-articles-define-the-features-of-the-new-state/
  4. ^ https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/11/4/arrest-of-abu-lulu-does-little-to-distance-rsf-from-sudan-massacre
  5. ^ a b Zaidan, Yasir (21 October 2025). "Ethno-mercenarism in Sudan's RSF and the Sahelian Arab Belt in Africa". Small Wars & Insurgencies: 1–24. doi:10.1080/09592318.2025.2576673.
  6. ^ Searcy, Kim. "Sahelian Arabs and their Role in the Sudan War".
  7. ^ Salih, Zeinab Mohammed (10 January 2025). "'If you are black, you are finished': the ethnically targeted violence raging in Sudan". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 29 March 2025.
  8. ^ Niarchos, Nicolas (19 May 2025). "Escape from Khartoum". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2 November 2025. Arab supremacy is one of the R.S.F.'s animating ideas.
  9. ^ Tubiana, Jérôme (14 May 2019). "The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan's Supposed Transition". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2 November 2025. If they rise to power, it would threaten to 'steal the revolution from the people,' as one protest slogan put it, transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism.
  10. ^ Zaidan, Yasir (21 October 2025). "Ethno-mercenarism in Sudan's RSF and the Sahelian Arab Belt in Africa". Small Wars & Insurgencies: 1–24. doi:10.1080/09592318.2025.2576673. Some analysts have suggested that Arab supremacy ideology is the driving force behind ethnic-based recruitment...Arab supremacy ideology, land disputes, desertification, and local and regional interventions all contributed to the emergence of ethno-mercenarism in the Sahel.
  11. ^ Deng, Daniel J. "The Rapid Support Forces and Sudan's War of Visions". Retrieved 2 November 2025. Hemedti's public rhetoric, calling for "an end to discrimination," "equal citizenship," and "the rights of all Sudanese, regardless of region or ethnicity", mirrors the inclusive ethos of the New Sudan Vision articulated by John Garang. In an April 2023 statement, for instance, he declared: "We want a Sudan that belongs to all Sudanese, not just a select group... a Sudan where every citizen, from Darfur to Kassala, is treated with dignity and equality".10 This pivot serves both ideological and strategic purposes. Domestically, it allows the RSF to tap into longstanding grievances among peripheral communities long marginalised by Khartoum's political order.
  12. ^ Mohammed Saleh, Zainab (19 June 2023). "Sudan paramilitary group boasts of detaining Islamists". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 14 November 2025.
  13. ^ "Sudan's RSF, accused of genocide, signs charter to form rival government". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 30 March 2025.
  14. ^ "Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment'". Radio Dabanga. 11 November 2024. Retrieved 27 March 2025.
  15. ^ "ANALYSIS OF RSF COMMANDER HIMEDTI'S SPEECH (9 OCT 2024)". Sudan In The News. 13 October 2024. Retrieved 30 March 2025.
  16. ^ a b "Factbox: Who are Sudan's Rapid Support Forces?". Reuters. 13 April 2023. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 15 April 2023. Analysts estimate the force numbers about 100,000, with bases and deployments across the country.
  17. ^ "Who Are Sudan's Rapid Support Forces?". The New York Times. 17 April 2023.
  18. ^ "Ethnic killings in one Sudan city left up to 15,000 dead: UN report". The Business Standard. 20 January 2024.
  19. ^ "UAE is 'main backer' behind Sudan war, intelligence officer tells Sky News". Sky News. Retrieved 30 October 2025.
  20. ^ "UAE increasing support to Sudan's RSF with new Chinese drones: Report". Middle East Eye. 28 October 2025. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  21. ^ "Chad denies supplying weapons to Sudan's RSF". TRT Afrika. 24 October 2024.
  22. ^ a b "Key Darfur groups join Sudanese army in its war against RSF paramilitary forces". 16 November 2023. Archived from the original on 18 November 2023. Retrieved 16 November 2023.
  23. ^ a b Walsh, Declan; Koettl, Christoph; Schmitt, Eric (29 September 2023). "Talking Peace in Sudan, the U.A.E. Secretly Fuels the Fight". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 October 2023.
  24. ^ "Wagner Out, Africa Corps in: Africa File, June 12, 2025".
  25. ^ Elbagir, Nima; Mezzofiore, Gianluca; Qiblawi, Tamara (20 April 2023). "Exclusive: Evidence emerges of Russia's Wagner arming militia leader battling Sudan's army". CNN. Archived from the original on 20 April 2023. Retrieved 20 April 2023. The Russian mercenary group Wagner has been supplying Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with missiles to aid their fight against the country's army, Sudanese and regional diplomatic sources have told CNN. The sources said the surface-to-air missiles have significantly buttressed RSF paramilitary fighters and their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo
  26. ^ "Wagner in Sudan: What have Russian mercenaries been up to?". BBC News. 24 April 2023. Archived from the original on 30 April 2023. Retrieved 29 April 2023. Its founder, Yevgeny Prighozin – who has close links to President Vladimir Putin – has said that, "Not a single Wagner PMC [private military company] fighter has been present in Sudan" for over two years. We've found no evidence that Russian mercenaries are currently inside the country. But there is evidence of Wagner's previous activities in Sudan...
  27. ^ "Sudan's army chief says Haftar denies supporting RSF; no confirmation on Wagner Group's involvement". Al-Ahram. 22 April 2023. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved 29 April 2023.
  28. ^ "Sudanese army accuses Libya's Haftar of joint border attack with RSF". Al Jazeera. 10 June 2025. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  29. ^ "Tamazuj group aligns with RSF in Sudan's ongoing war - Sudan Tribune". 16 October 2023. Archived from the original on 16 October 2023.
  30. ^ "Sudan's army takes full control of Khartoum, RSF remains defiant". Al Jazeera.
  31. ^ "UAE deployed radar to Somalia's Puntland to defend from Houthi attacks, supply Sudan's RSF". Middle East Monitor. 27 April 2025. Retrieved 31 October 2025.
  32. ^ "Sudan Accuses Puntland of Enabling RSF Operations via Bosaso Airport". African Security Analysis. Retrieved 31 October 2025.
  33. ^ a b Faucon, Benoit; Said, Summer; Malsin, Jared (19 April 2023). "Libyan Militia and Egypt's Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 19 April 2023. Retrieved 19 April 2023. "Mr. Haftar, who is backed by Russia and the United Arab Emirates, sent at least one shipment of ammunition on Monday (17 April) from Libya to Sudan to replenish supplies for Gen. Dagalo," the people familiar with the matter said.
  34. ^ a b "Inside Sudan's Endless Civil War". Bloomberg. Retrieved 31 October 2025.
  35. ^ Sabbagh, Dan (6 February 2024). "Ukrainian special forces 'in Sudan operating against Russian mercenaries'". The Guardian.
  36. ^ "Sudan Drawing Down Troops in Yemen in Recent Months". Voice of America. 30 October 2019. Retrieved 30 October 2019.
  37. ^ "Huge Sudanese losses in Yemen highlight fighters' role in the conflict". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 10 November 2019.
  38. ^ "SPLM-N and Popular Defense Forces field commanders meet in South Kordofan". Sudan War Monitor. 14 October 2023. Archived from the original on 5 January 2024. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
  39. ^ "Malik Agar reveals government-proposed roadmap to end Sudan's war". Sudan Tribune. 6 August 2023. Archived from the original on 5 September 2023. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
  40. ^ "SLM faction joins Sudanese army against RSF in Darfur". Sudan Tribune. 1 August 2023. Archived from the original on 5 September 2023. Retrieved 2 August 2023.
  41. ^ Copnall, James; Kupemba, Danai Nesta (17 November 2023). "Sudan civil war: Darfur's Jem rebels join army fight against RSF". BBC News. Archived from the original on 17 November 2023. Retrieved 17 November 2023.
  42. ^ Kottasová, Ivana (7 November 2025). "Sudan's bloody conflict is plagued by foreign influence – here is what we know". CNN. Retrieved 12 November 2025.
  43. ^ Wintour, Patrick (4 November 2025). "As criticism grows, is UAE ready to walk away from Sudan's RSF militia?". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 12 November 2025.
  44. ^ ""الدعم السريع" تحذف كلمة "قدس" من شعارها!". سما الإخبارية (in Arabic). 25 April 2023. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  45. ^ "قوات "الدعم السريع" تحذف كلمة "قدس" من شعارها! ومستشار حميدتي ينتقد الفلسطينيين 0". عربي بوست — ArabicPost.net. 26 April 2023. Archived from the original on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  46. ^ "عبر قناة إسرائيلية.. مستشار حميدتي يثير الجدل بتصريحات عن حماس | التلفزيون العربي". التلفزيون العربي. 25 April 2023. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  47. ^ "أزمة السودان.. إسرائيل أحدث المنضمين لـ"راغبي الوساطة"". 25 April 2023. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  48. ^ Tekle, Tesfa-Alem (11 June 2014). "Calls for probe into Iran toxic waste dumped in Eritrea". Sudan Tribune. Archived from the original on 3 December 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  49. ^ "Who are Sudan's RSF and their commander Hemeti?". Al Jazeera English. 6 June 2019. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 6 June 2019.
  50. ^ "UN imposes sanctions on two RSF generals for war crimes". Sudan Tribune. 9 November 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2025.
  51. ^ a b c Loeb, Jonathan (9 September 2015). ""Men With No Mercy" – Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan". Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on 6 September 2019. Retrieved 13 September 2019.
  52. ^ a b "Sudan withdraws 10,000 troops from Yemen". Sudan Tribune. 30 October 2019. Archived from the original on 31 October 2019. Retrieved 31 October 2019.
  53. ^ a b "1,000 Sudanese militiamen arrive in Libya". Radio Dabanga. 25 July 2019. Archived from the original on 26 July 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
  54. ^ Niarchos, Nicolas (19 May 2025). "Escape from Khartoum". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  55. ^ a b Tubiana, Jérôme (14 May 2019). "The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan's Supposed Transition". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  56. ^ Eltayeb, Amgad Fareid; Verhoeven, Ann-Marie (26 March 2025). "Debating Trump 2.0 and Implications for Africa - "The Americans want quick fixes"". German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  57. ^ Stanton, Gregory (14 April 2025). "The UK's Failure to Recognize the Genocide in Sudan". Genocide Watch. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  58. ^ Wilson, Tabby; Booty, Natasha (11 July 2025). "War crimes being committed in Sudan, ICC believes". BBC News Africa. BBC. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  59. ^ Gedeon, Joseph; Beaumont, Peter (7 January 2025). "US declares Sudan's paramilitary forces committed genocide during civil war". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  60. ^ Zaidan, Yasir (22 July 2024). "Amid humanitarian crisis and ongoing fighting, Africa's war-scarred Sahel region faces new threat: Ethno-mercenaries". The Conversation. Retrieved 7 November 2025.
  61. ^ Mohammed Salih, Zeinab; Burke, Jason (19 June 2023). "Sudan paramilitary group boasts of detaining Islamists". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  62. ^ Awasthi, Abhishek (19 June 2023). "Sudan paramilitary group intensifies crackdown on Islamists". Firstpost. Retrieved 14 November 2025.
  63. ^ Eltayeb, Amgad Fareid (30 October 2025). "Washington's 'Blob' is helping whitewash war crimes in Sudan". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  64. ^ Eltayeb, Amgad Fareid (27 July 2023). "Sudan: An open letter to allies of the Rapid Support Forces". The Africa Report. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  65. ^ "Sudan's RSF and allies formalise vision for parallel government". Reuters. Dubai. 5 March 2025. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  66. ^ Sampson, Eve (27 July 2025). "Leaders of Parallel Government Named in War-Torn Sudan". The New York Times. Nairobi. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  67. ^ Sobhan, Shakeel (27 July 2025). "Sudan: RSF forms rival government, deepening fissure". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  68. ^ a b "Sudan's RSF, accused of genocide, signs charter to form rival government". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 30 March 2025.
  69. ^ Abuzaid, Osama (2 August 2025). "Why Sudanese people are losing faith in the 'government of hope'". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  70. ^ "Security Council rejects creation of rival government in Sudan". UN News. United Nations Department of Global Communications. 13 August 2025. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  71. ^ "British domestic politics clash with human rights in the Horn of Africa". The Economist. 1 October 2016. Archived from the original on 10 February 2017. Retrieved 1 October 2016.
  72. ^ Morgan, Hiba (17 November 2017). "Sudan's RSF unit accused of abuses against migrants". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2 November 2025.
  73. ^ de Waal, Alex (20 July 2019). "Sudan crisis: The ruthless mercenaries who run the country for gold". BBC News. Archived from the original on 21 July 2019. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
  74. ^ a b c d "Exposing the RSF's secret financial network". Global Witness. 9 December 2019. Archived from the original on 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
  75. ^ Nashed, Mat. "The soft-power campaign of Sudan's RSF leader 'Hemedti'". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 20 April 2023. Retrieved 12 May 2023.
  76. ^ "'A true genocide': RSF kills 'at least 1,500 people' in Sudan's el-Fasher". Al Jazeera. 29 October 2025. Retrieved 30 October 2025.
  77. ^ "Airlift Between the UAE and Chad: Military Support to the RSF in Sudan Under Humanitarian Guise". Al Estiklal.
  78. ^ "UAE accused of using Chad hospital as a cover for weapons supply to Sudan's rebel RSF". African Energy.
  79. ^ "Chad: Limiting the Impact of the War in Sudan on Ouaddaï". International Crisis Group. 14 November 2024.
  80. ^ "Sudan denies talks with Chad to ease tensions over RSF support". Sudan Tribune. 8 March 2025.
  81. ^ "Poverty drives Chadian youth to join Sudan's brutal RSF". The New Arab.
  82. ^ "Sudanese authorities arrest Ethiopian female snipers". Sudan Tribune. 20 June 2024.
  83. ^ "Reconsidering Cairo's Approach to the Sudanese Civil War". The Washington Institute.
  84. ^ "Israeli security delegation visits Khartoum at invitation of Rapid Support Forces". Mada Masr. 23 January 2022. Wikidata Q136689583. Archived from the original on 2 November 2025.
  85. ^ a b Ben Caspit (21 April 2023). "Israel's security chiefs split on supporting Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti". Al-Monitor. Wikidata Q136689655. Archived from the original on 20 September 2023.
  86. ^ Alex de Waal (21 October 2024). "Israel, a behind-the-scenes powerbroker in Sudan". Responsible Statecraft. Wikidata Q136689702. Archived from the original on 2 November 2025.
  87. ^ "Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan [S/2024/65]" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. Retrieved 31 October 2025.
  88. ^ "Kenyan Weapons Linked to Sudan's Civil War". 15 June 2025.
  89. ^ "Exposed: The Kenya-Sudan shadowy arms deal". YouTube. 15 June 2025.
  90. ^ "Sudan urges Kenya to cease alleged support of RSF". 24 June 2025.
  91. ^ a b "As war rages in Sudan, countries angle for advantage". Japan Times. 23 April 2023. Archived from the original on 10 May 2023. Retrieved 24 April 2023.
  92. ^ "Exclusive: Sudan militia leader grew rich by selling gold". Reuters. 26 November 2019. Archived from the original on 4 June 2023. Retrieved 24 April 2023.
  93. ^ Smith, Patrick (13 January 2021). "Sudan: Hemeti and the $16bn annual gold exports to the UAE". The Africa Report. Archived from the original on 9 May 2023. Retrieved 24 April 2023.
  94. ^ "Sheikh Mohamed meets deputy chairman of Sudan's Sovereignty Council". The National. 9 February 2022. Archived from the original on 30 April 2023. Retrieved 24 April 2023.
  95. ^ "UAE President receives Chairman of Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan". WAM. 14 February 2023.
  96. ^ a b "The Sheikh Who Conquered Soccer and Coddles Warlords". The New York Times. 29 June 2025.
  97. ^ "Gold exports flow from Sudan to UАЕ despite political tensions". Sudan Tribune. 13 February 2024. Archived from the original on 11 June 2024. Retrieved 21 February 2024.
  98. ^ "U.S. lawmakers call on UAE to cease support for Sudan's RSF". SUDAN TRIBUNE. 21 December 2023. Retrieved 2 January 2024.
  99. ^ "Sudan demands UN condemnation of UAE support for RSF". Sudan Tribunal. 29 March 2024. Archived from the original on 1 April 2024. Retrieved 6 April 2024.
  100. ^ "Sudan reveals the arrival of new supplies to the militia from the UAE via Chad". 20 April 2024. Archived from the original on 23 April 2024. Retrieved 23 April 2024.
  101. ^ "Sudan and UAE clash at UN Security Council over Sudan civil war". Reuters. 18 June 2024.
  102. ^ "US envoy accuses Iran and UAE of 'complicity' in Sudan war". 19 April 2024. Archived from the original on 20 April 2024. Retrieved 23 April 2024.
  103. ^ "'Smoking gun' evidence points to UAE involvement in Sudan civil war". The Guardian. Retrieved 25 July 2024.
  104. ^ "Sudan: Abusive Warring Parties Acquire New Weapons". HRW. 9 September 2024. Archived from the original on 9 September 2024. Retrieved 17 September 2024.
  105. ^ "Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment". HRW. 9 September 2024. Archived from the original on 9 September 2024. Retrieved 17 September 2024.
  106. ^ "Sudan reiterates accusations of UAE support for RSF, urges UN action". 12 October 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  107. ^ Zengerle, Patricia (21 November 2024). "US lawmakers seek to halt weapons sales to UAE, citing Sudan". Reuters. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
  108. ^ "Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation". Amnesty International. 14 November 2024. Retrieved 24 December 2024.
  109. ^ Gramer, Robbie; Gould, Joe (7 March 2025). "Top lawmaker blocking US arms sales to UAE over role in Sudan war". Politico. Archived from the original on 13 March 2025. Retrieved 24 March 2025.
  110. ^ "Van Hollen, Jacobs Reintroduce Bill to Prohibit U.S. Arms Sales to UAE Until They Cease Support of RSF in Sudan". vanhollen.senate.gov. 11 March 2025. Archived from the original on 12 March 2025. Retrieved 24 March 2025.
  111. ^ "Sudanese army general threatens to attack Chadian airports". 23 March 2025. Archived from the original on 19 March 2025. Retrieved 7 April 2025.
  112. ^ Joshi, Shraddha (21 April 2025). "Activists call for UAE boycott over its backing for the RSF in Sudan". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 5 May 2025.
  113. ^ Farmer, Ben (4 August 2025). "Colombian mercenaries hired to fight for Sudan rebels". The Telegraph. Retrieved 12 August 2025.
  114. ^ a b "ذراع الكرملين و"ذهب السودان الضائع".. ما علاقة مجموعة فاغنر بحميدتي؟". التلفزيون العربي (in Arabic). Archived from the original on 16 April 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  115. ^ "Russia, Wagner Group expand ties with Sudan". Al-Monitor. 13 April 2022. Archived from the original on 13 April 2022. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  116. ^ "The two generals fighting in Sudan helped Putin plunder the country's gold to fund Russia's war in Ukraine". Business Insider. 15 April 2023. Archived from the original on 1 May 2023. Retrieved 29 April 2023.
  117. ^ "Russian envoy meets Sudan's army commander to show support". Reuters. 29 April 2024. Retrieved 1 November 2025.
  118. ^ "Wagner Out, Africa Corps in: Africa File, June 12, 2025".
  119. ^ "Inside Sudan's Endless Civil War". Bloomberg. 2024. Retrieved 1 November 2025.
  120. ^ "Sudan unrest: What are the Rapid Support Forces?". Al Jazeera. 16 April 2023. Archived from the original on 21 April 2023. Retrieved 21 April 2023.
  121. ^ "Yemen: Events of 2018". World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Yemen. Human Rights Watch. 17 January 2019. Archived from the original on 27 January 2022. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  122. ^ el-Baghdadi, Iyad (11 June 2019). "The Princes Who Want to Destroy Any Hope for Arab Democracy". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 28 August 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  123. ^ UNHCR. "Sudan's Controversial Rapid Support Forces Bolster Saudi Efforts in Yemen". Refworld. Archived from the original on 31 May 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  124. ^ Halliday, Josh; Asthana, Anushka (2 April 2017). "Met police look at allegations of Saudi war crimes in Yemen". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 19 May 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  125. ^ Alex De Waal (17 April 2023). "Sudan conflict: Hemedti – the warlord who built a paramilitary force more powerful than the state". The Conversation. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  126. ^ "Sudan's Controversial Rapid Support Forces Bolster Saudi Efforts in Yemen". jamestown.org. Retrieved 13 April 2025.
  127. ^ Abdelaziz, Khalid; Eltahir, Nafisa; Eltahir, Nafisa (15 April 2023). "Sudan clashes kill at least 25 in power struggle between army, paramilitaries". Reuters. Archived from the original on 15 April 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  128. ^ "'People are terrified': Heavy fighting erupts in Sudan". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 15 April 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  129. ^ "Sudan: Army and RSF battle over key sites, leaving 56 civilians dead". BBC News. 15 April 2023. Archived from the original on 15 April 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  130. ^ MacDiarmid, Campbell (18 April 2023). "Day-long ceasefire agreed in Sudan after intense international mediation". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 18 April 2023. Retrieved 18 April 2023.
  131. ^ "Sudan conflict: UK begins evacuation of British nationals amid cease-fire". Politico. 25 April 2023. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved 25 April 2023.
  132. ^ "The UAE sold arms to both warring parties in Sudan". Military Africa. 22 April 2023. Archived from the original on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 22 April 2023.
  133. ^ "Sudanese army denies RSF control of Sinjah, fighting continues amidst displacement". 30 June 2024. Archived from the original on 30 June 2024. Retrieved 4 July 2024.
  134. ^ a b "Incapable of defeating each other, the generals fight on". Africa Confidential. 65 (18). 5 September 2024.
  135. ^ "The Global War Machine Supplying Colombian Mercenaries to Fight in Sudan". The Wall Street Journal. 11 December 2024.
  136. ^ Abdelaziz, Khalid (22 February 2025). "Sudan's RSF, allies sign charter to form parallel government, two signatories say". Reuters.
  137. ^ Nashed, Mat. "Sudan's army retakes presidential palace in Khartoum, strikes blow to RSF". Al Jazeera.
  138. ^ Walsh, Declan; Prickett, Ivor (26 March 2025). "Paramilitary Fighters Flee Sudan's Capital, a Major Shift in Civil War". The New York Times.
  139. ^ a b Raymond, Nathaniel (27 October 2025). "Human Security Emergency: El Fasher falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing". Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
  140. ^ "Sudan war: US senators press Trump for action after RSF 'horrors' in Al Fasher". TRT Afrika. 30 October 2025. Retrieved 31 October 2025.
  141. ^ "Unmasking RSF brigadier "Abu Lulu"". Sudans Post. 24 August 2025. Retrieved 5 November 2025.
  142. ^ "Who is 'Issa Abu Lulu,' the Butcher of El-Fasher?". The Sudan Times. 30 October 2025. Retrieved 5 November 2025.
  143. ^ Husham, Eiad (4 November 2025). "Arrest of 'Abu Lulu' does little to distance RSF from Sudan massacre". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 5 November 2025.
  144. ^ a b Salih, Zeinab Mohammed; Burke, Jason (11 June 2019). "Sudanese doctors say dozens of people raped during sit-in attack". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 11 June 2019. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  145. ^ a b "Sudan crisis: Death toll from crackdown rises to 60, opposition says". BBC News. 5 June 2019. Archived from the original on 14 June 2019. Retrieved 5 June 2019.
  146. ^ Lynch, Justin (5 June 2019). "Remember The Darfur Genocide? With Saudi Help, One of the Killer Commanders There Is Taking Over Sudan". The Daily Beast. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 8 June 2019.
  147. ^ Albaih, Khalid (7 June 2019). "No, it's not over for the Sudanese revolution". Al Jazeera English. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 7 June 2019.
  148. ^ Linge, Thomas van (5 June 2019). "#Sudan : the footage shows how bricks of cement were tied to the bodies in order to make them sink to the bodum of the #Nile so they could never be found. #SudanUprising". @ThomasVLinge. Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 18 July 2019.
  149. ^ Elbagir, Yousra (4 June 2019). "He says, "some people were beaten to death and thrown in the Nile, some shot multiple times and thrown in the Nile and others were hacked with machetes and thrown in the Nile. It was a massacre."". @X. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  150. ^ Obai (5 June 2019). "pic.twitter.com/73PBXXe7xQ". @grdoon. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
  151. ^ a b "Sudan: Remove Rapid Support Forces from Khartoum streets immediately". Amnesty International. 6 June 2019. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 7 June 2019.
  152. ^ "Sudan army, protesters to resume talks on transitional council". Al Jazeera English. 12 June 2019. Archived from the original on 12 June 2019. Retrieved 12 June 2019.
  153. ^ a b الهامش, صوت (10 June 2019). "مليشيا الدعم السريع تركب مجزرة في "دليج" وتحرق السوق وتنهب ممتلكات المواطنين". صوت الهامش. al-Hamish Voice. Archived from the original on 12 June 2019. Retrieved 12 June 2019.
  154. ^ Ismail, Nermin (6 September 2019). "Sudan eyewitness: Militiamen raped men, women". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 10 June 2019. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  155. ^ a b "Sudanese Rapid Support Forces Are Targeting Hospitals, Peaceful Sit-In; Dozens of Civilians Reported Killed". PHR. 3 June 2019. Archived from the original on 5 June 2019. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  156. ^ Kirkpatrick, David D. (28 December 2018). "On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur". The New York Times.
  157. ^ Mat Nashed (20 March 2024). "Sudan residents describe raids, evictions by RSF soldiers". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
  158. ^ "'No woman feels safe': sexual violence rampant in Sudan war". Yahoo News. 7 June 2023.
  159. ^ "Hospitals, places of worship destroyed as month-long war continues to rage throughout Sudan". Mada Masr.
  160. ^ "Sudan: Widespread Sexual Violence in the Capital". 28 July 2024. Archived from the original on 30 July 2024. Retrieved 4 August 2024.
  161. ^ "Fighting reignites between Sudan army, RSF in Khartoum". Al Jazeera. 3 July 2023. Archived from the original on 2 July 2023. Retrieved 3 July 2023.
  162. ^ "Save the Children: Children as young as 12 raped as sexual violence rips through Sudan". Radio Dabanga. 10 July 2023. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 19 July 2023.
  163. ^ Psaledakis, Daphne (14 November 2024). "US imposes sanctions on Sudanese paramilitary commander". Reuters. Retrieved 14 November 2024.
  164. ^ Hansler, Jennifer (7 January 2025). "US determines Sudan's RSF paramilitary group committed genocide in country's civil war". CNN. Retrieved 7 January 2025.
  165. ^ "Genocide Determination in Sudan and Imposing Accountability Measures". United States Department of State. Retrieved 7 January 2025.
  166. ^ a b Princewill, Nimi (28 October 2025). "Bloodbath feared as rebels trap thousands in Sudan city. How did we get here and what might come next?". CNN. Retrieved 29 October 2025.
  167. ^ Magdy, Samy (29 October 2025). "Sudan's paramilitary killed hundreds including hospital patients in Darfur, residents say". Associated Press. Retrieved 29 October 2025.
  168. ^ Salhani, Justin (28 October 2025). "Yale report finds evidence of RSF mass killings in Sudan's el-Fasher". Al Jazeera.
  169. ^ Mureithi, Carlos (28 October 2025). "Mass killings reported in Sudanese city seized by paramilitary group". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 29 October 2025.
  170. ^ "Sudan: Appalling reports of summary executions and other serious violations, as RSF makes major territorial gains in El Fasher and North Kordofan". OHCHR. Retrieved 29 October 2025.
  171. ^ "El-Fasher: Barrier being built around besieged Sudan city, satellite images show". BBC. 30 August 2025. Retrieved 29 October 2025.
  172. ^ Morgan, Hiba. "Sudan's RSF unit accused of abuses against migrants". Al Jazeera.
  173. ^ "Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces". HRW. 1 March 2021.
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Rapid_Support_Forces&oldid=1328108186"